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MARKET POWER AND MONOPOLY POWER IN
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
One of the most vexing and pervasive problems courts confront
in antitrust litigation is determining how much control over price a
firm must possess to justify imposing liability for allegedly anticom-
petitive behavior. In recent years this determination has taken on
added significance because courts have shown a willingness to ex-
cuse firms lacking sufficient control over price from antitrust
liability.
Courts, legal scholars, and economists define market power as
the ability to raise prices above the competitive market level for a
period of time long enough to make doing so profitable. Legal
scholars and economists generally regard a substantial amount of
market power as monopoly power. Courts, in contrast, only implic-
itly recognize that monopoly power is some substantial degree of
control over the market, and traditionally define monopoly power as
the ability to control prices or exclude competition.
In Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos. I and Westman Commis-
sion Co. v. Hobart International Co.,2 the Tenth Circuit set forth tests
for determining whether a firm has market power and for distin-
guishing market power from monopoly power. This Note examines
those tests and argues that the Tenth Circuit's monopoly power test
is an improvement over the traditional legal test because it focuses
the inquiry on the underlying economic principles. This Note also
shows, however, that the court's market power test, although some-
what ambiguous, fails to correctly discern the presence of market
power.
The first section of this Note discusses the role of market power
and monopoly power in antitrust litigation and examines how courts
have defined the two terms. Section II evaluates the legal basis for
the Tenth Circuit's market power and monopoly power tests. Sec-
tion III discusses an independent economic rationale for the Tenth
Circuit's tests and evaluates the tests on that basis. Finally, the con-
tribution of the Tenth Circuit's tests to the body of antitrust law is
assessed.
1 783 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1986).





Since its inception, antitrust law has sought to define the limits
of acceptable exercises of economic power by business. Commenta-
tors still debate the underlying goals of the Sherman Antitrust Act 3
and other antitrust laws, 4 and interpretations of the goals of the an-
titrust laws have changed over time,5 but recent Supreme Court de-
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The Sherman Act is the foundation of U.S. antitrust
law.
4 The other major antitrust statutes include the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) (as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, id. §§ 13-13b, 21a
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, id. §§ 41-58 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987). The significant sections of the Sherman Act include Section 1, which
states that "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce... is hereby declared ... illegal," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), and section 2, which
makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire...
to monopolize ... trade," id. § 2. The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, generally makes it "unlawful ... to discriminate in price... where the effect of
such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a mo-
nopoly." Id. § 13. The Federal Trade Commission Act makes unlawful "[u]nfair meth-
ods of competition ... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Id. § 45.
Some commentators argue that the antitrust laws were mainly intended to embody
political values while others believe that the laws' purpose is to maximize economic effi-
ciency. For example, Professor Pitofsky argues that the antitrust laws are premised on
the belief that excessive concentrations of economic power create antidemocratic polit-
ical pressures and thus if a few corporate giants dominate the economy, then the state
will be forced to play a more intrusive role in the economy to maintain the democratic
system. Pitofsky explains that economic efficiency is also an important goal of antitrust
law but contends that concentrating on economic efficiency to the exclusion of any focus
on the underlying political purpose misinterprets the goals of the antitrust laws. Pitof-
sky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979). Professors Areeda
and Turner believe that the antitrust laws may embody a commitment to both economic
efficiency and other populist objectives such as limiting the size of business, dispersing
wealth, and furthering entrepreneurial opportunities. They believe, however, that
courts are ill-equipped to promote populist goals through antitrust policy except when
those goals and the promotion of efficiency coincide. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 103-13
(1978). Professor Fox contends that besides dispersing economic power, assuring the
satisfaction of consumers, and creating the opportunity to compete in the market, the
antitrust laws were designed to protect the competitive process. She takes a somewhat
broader view of efficiency and feels that protecting opportunities for small entrepre-
neurs may be warranted on efficiency grounds if it serves long-run consumer interests.
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1176-90
(1981). Professor Bork believes that maximizing economic efficiency is and ought to be
the only goal of antitrust policy. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 81-89 (1978).
5 Some early Supreme Court decisions manifested a concern for the continued
existence of competitors and at one point the Court seemed willing to sacrifice eco-
nomic efficiency to help ensure the survival of competitors. In United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897), the Court noted that "[m]ere reduc-
tion in the price of the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of... a
class [of small dealers and worthy men] and the absorption of control over one com-
modity by an all-powerful combination of capital." The Court expressed a similar senti-
ment in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), where it recognized
"Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, lo-
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cisions suggest that the primary goal of antitrust law is to promote
consumer welfare. 6 Thus, many current judicial inquiries about
business behavior focus on whether consumers have suffered or po-
tentially will suffer adverse effects from a particular business
practice.
To assess the impact of a firm's behavior on consumers, courts
in many antitrust cases examine not only the firm's behavior but also
the extent of the firm's control over its market. A firm with no
power to control the market price cannot systematically harm con-
sumers.7 Invariably, under the judicially-created doctrines designed
to implement the broad provisions of the antitrust laws, this inquiry
leads courts to examine the extent of a firm's control over market
price. This inquiry is designed to determine whether a firm pos-
sesses "market power," "monopoly power," or no power at all.
A. Market Power
Legal scholars generally define market power as the "ability of a
firm.. . to raise price above the competitive level without losing so
many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and
must be rescinded."8 The Supreme Court has set forth an essen-
tially identical definition recognizing that "[a]s an economic matter,
cally owned businesses [even though] occasional higher costs and prices might result."
On other occasions, however, the Court argued that "unrestrained interaction of com-
petitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices,
the highest quality and the greatest material progress." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
6 In more recent decisions, the Court has asserted that antitrust law should be
regarded as a "'consumer welfare prescription,'" NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343
(1979), implying that efficiency is the standard by which courts should judge business
behavior. See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (when
examining alleged anticompetitive practice, Court inquires "whether the practice ...
tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output [or] 'increase economic efficiency
and render markets more ... competitive' " (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978))). For a further discussion of the role of
consumer welfare in antitrust law, see Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 566 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part) (citing cases).
7 Without power to control the market, a firm that raises the price of its product
cannot maintain that increase because other firms will offer consumers lower prices
thereby forcing the price-raising firms either to alter their practices or to lose sales.
Although in the short run, a firm raising its price may injure some consumers, other
competitors, or even itself, the market prevents these firms from imposing harm on con-
sumers for any significant period of time. As a result, such a firm cannot systematically
harm consumers. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984).
8 Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 937
(1981); see also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 501 ("market power... is the
ability to raise price without a total loss of sales"); Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 20
("Market powqr is the ability to raise price significantly without losing so many sales that
the increase is unprofitable.").
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market power exists whenever prices can be raised above the levels
that would be charged in a competitive market."9 Numerous lower
courts have adopted the Court's standard market power definition' °
and employ various methods to determine whether a firm has mar-
ket power."
Courts have examined market power when judging the reasona-
9 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984).
10 E.g., Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d 490,495 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987) ("market power [is] the ability to raise prices above levels
that would exist in a perfectly competitive market"); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797
F.2d 1430, 1435 (7th Cir. 1986) ("market power... [is the] power to raise price above
the competitive level without losing so many sales that the price increase would be un-
profitable"); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir.
1982) ("market power... is [the] power to raise prices significantly above the competi-
tive level without losing all of one's business"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); Mara-
thon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1981) ("market power [is] the
power to raise prices above ... levels that would occur in a competitive marketplace").
11 Although market power and monopoly power are distinct legal concepts, courts
use the same methods for determining whether a firm has market power as they do when
determining whether a firm possesses monopoly power. Applications of the courts'
methods differ for the two types of power, however, as the complaining party must con-
vince the court of a greater degree of control in a monopolization case than in a case
involving market power. Professors Areeda and Turner adopt this same approach. Com-
pare P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, 507-16 (proving market power) with 3 id. at
801-07 (proving "substantial," i.e., monopoly power).
By far the most common method of assessing a firm's market power or monopoly
power is to examine its share of the properly defined product market. In probably the
most famous example of the use of market share, Judge Hand ruled in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), that a market share of over ninety
percent would be sufficient to support a finding of monopoly. Since that time, courts
have used market share to determine if a firm has either monopoly power or market
power. E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 26-27 (30%o share of relevant
market does not constitute market power); Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv.
Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 1984) (32%o to 35% market share insufficient to estab-
lish monopoly power), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985). In Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Tenth
Circuit looked to the" 'reasonable interchangeability of use to which two or more prod-
ucts can be put'" and "'[t]he cross-elasticity of demand, i.e., the extent to which con-
sumer preference shifts freely between two or more products' " as factors indicative of
market power. Id. at 1158 (quoting 2 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 6G.04[1] (1982)). Courts also examine a firm's profitability. United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) ("du Pont's profits,
while liberal .. . [did not] demonstrate the existence of a monopoly"). Finally, some
courts inquire into the existence of barriers to entry, i.e., those costs "borne by a firm
which seeks to enter an industry, but.., not.., by firms already in the industry," G.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). One of the first decisions to ex-
amine barriers to entry was American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 796-
97 (1946). For more recent discussions of entry barriers, see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. In-
dus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986); California v. Ameri-
can Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 275 (1989);
Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335-36 (7th Cir.
1986); Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 825, 878-84 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd, 740 F.2d 980 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985).
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bleness of allegedly anticompetitive business practices 12 and the le-
gality of mergers.' 3 They use the market power inquiry to
12 Market power inquiries arise in cases falling under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). To constitute a violation under Section 1, a court must determine,
among other things, that the firm's activities unreasonably restrained trade or com-
merce. 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw § 9.1, at 5 (1980). The judicial doctrine
under which courts analyze market power in these cases is called the Rule of Reason.
Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985); Landes &
Posner, supra note 8, at 937, 956 n.35.
Those Section I cases in which market power is an important part of the analysis
include tying arrangements and refusals to deal. A tying arrangement is an "agreement
by a party to sell one product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the
buyer also purchases a different [tied] product." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Courts are concerned about tying arrangements because they fear
that firms with "a monopoly... of one product [will] obtain[ ] a second, distinct monop-
oly of a good used in conjunction with the first product." R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOx,
ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 802 (2d ed. 1981). But
even if a firm lacks a monopoly, there is still concern that "market power from a product
in great demand (the tying item) is exercised to influence sales of a different, less desira-
ble product (the tied item)." 2 E. KINTNER, supra, § 10.52, at 224.
Judicial treatment of tie-in cases has a per se flavor but such condemnation occurs
only when the "threshold" of "a substantial potential for impact on competition" is
established. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 16. Absent such a threshold
showing, the inquiry focuses on the actual effects of the tie-in arrangements, an ap-
proach similar to the Rule of Reason analysis. E.g., id. at 29. In Jefferson Parish the Court
required the plaintiff first to demonstrate the defendant's control (i.e., market power), so
that it could determine whether to apply a per se analysis. Upon the plaintiff's failure to
show market power, the Court turned from a per se analysis to an examination of whether
the tie-in "unreasonably restrained competition," an approach indicative of a Rule of
Reason analysis. Id. at 29-30.
In concurrence, four members of the Court argued that a failure to demonstrate an
"exclusionary impact in the tied product market . . .or . . . the harmful exercise of
market power," id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring), indicates that there was no poten-
tial for "any adverse impact." Id. at 37. Thus, the concurringJustices would dismiss tie-
in cases upon the plaintiff's failure to prove market power. Proving market power, how-
ever, was not enough for the concurring Justices to condemn the practice. Even if the
plaintiff were able to show market power, they would proceed with a Rule of Reason
analysis. As a result of the concurrence's approach, the per se element of tie-in cases may
well disappear. Nonetheless, courts conducting this "threshold" inquiry today consider,
among other things, whether the defendant has "market power in the tying product
[and] more often than not require some kind of showing of an anticompetitive effect in
the tied product market." E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCEDURE: 1986 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 72 (1986).
An exception to the market power analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act
involves horizontal price-fixing cases where the possession of market power by the de-
fendants is irrelevant. Combinations, conspiracies, and contracts designed to fix prices
were declared illegal per se in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940), where the Court declared that "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabiliz-
ing [prices] is illegal per se." Id. at 223.
13 Merger challenges primarily arise under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Section 7 regulates mergers by prohibiting the acquisition
of "the whole or any part of the stock or ... assets of another ... engaged . . . in
commerce ... where ... the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id. The current Department ofJustice
enforcement policy concerning mergers and acquisitions is outlined in the Department's
1984 Merger Guidelines. United States Department ofJustice 1984 Merger Guidelines,
194 [Vol. 75:190
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determine whether a firm can restrain competition in the relevant
market.' 4 If the firm has such power, then a court determines
whether the alleged anticompetitive practice tends to harm consum-
ers,' 5 and if it does, then the court declares the firm's practice ille-
gal. If the firm lacks market power, then the defendant need not
justify the practice. 16 Thus, although possessing market power does
not in and of itself subject a firm to liability under the antitrust laws,
it is the initial element that courts consider when determining
whether a challenged practice allegedly harms consumers. 17
B. Monopoly Power
Legal scholars regard monopoly power as "a high degree of
market power."'18 Under this formulation, a firm with monopoly
power has a greater ability to control price than a firm with mere
market power. Courts, on the other hand, do not explicitly define
monopoly power in terms of market power. Instead, they tradition-
ally define monopoly power as the "power to control prices or ex-
clude competition."1 9 Although it has been implicitly recognized
46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169 Spec. Supp. § 3.3, at S-I (1984) [here-
inafter Merger Guidelines]. Their "unifying theme ... is that mergers should not be
permitted to create or enhance 'market power' or to facilitate its exercise ... [where
market power is defined as the] ability of [a] firm[] profitably to maintain prices above
competitive levels for a significant period of time." Id. For a typical discussion of mar-
ket power in the context of a merger case challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
see United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984)
(court adopts "market power" definition of Guidelines).
14 E.g., General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596
(7th Cir. 1984).
15 Id. at 596. In their consideration of the potential harm to consumers, courts
allow defendants to justify their business practices by showing that the challenged prac-
tice benefits consumers. E.g., id. For antitrust violations involving tie-ins, plaintiffs ap-
parently can still proceed under a Rule of Reason analysis even though there is no
showing of market power. See supra note 12.
16 Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334-35
(7th Cir. 1986).
17 The role of market power is more straight forward in merger cases than in Rule
of Reason cases considered under section I of the Sherman Act. Mergers challenges
arise when there is a fear that combining two previously competing firms will result in
reduced competition, enabling the newly formed firm to exercise market power to the
detriment of consumers. Thus, if a court finds that a merger of competitors "substan-
tially ... lessen[s] competition, or ... tend[s] to create a monopoly," 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982), then the merger will be forbidden unless the court recognizes an "efficiency" or
"failing company" defense. For a discussion of the current role of these two defenses,
see Merger Guidelines, supra note 13, § 3.3, at S-14 to S-15.
18 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 937; see also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 4, at 800-02 (defining monopoly power as substantial market power).
19 The Supreme Court first defined monopoly power in United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956), and numerous other decisions have
adopted it. E.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596
n.20 (1985); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243, 252
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors,
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that monopoly power is some degree of control greater than mere
market power,20 the relationship between the legal definition of mo-
nopoly power and the more general concept of monopoly power
developed by legal scholars and economists has not been carefully
examined by courts.
Monopoly power becomes an issue in cases alleging monopolis-
tic behavior falling under the prohibition of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.21 Most important of the section 2 violations are
monopolization and attempted monopolization. 22 The Supreme
Court's formulation of the monopolization offense is twofold: the
defendant must possess monopoly power in the relevant market,
and the defendant must willfully acquire or maintain that power.2
3
786 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986); Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Service
of Am., Inc., 651 F.2d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981). For a
discussion of the methods of proving monopoly power, see supra note 11.
20 Early on the Supreme Court recognized that market power is some lesser degree
of control over price than the control that a monopolist possesses. In du Pont, the court
noted that "in [the production of] every nonstandardized commodity.., each manufac-
turer ha[s] power over price... [h]owever, this power ... is not the power that makes an
illegal monopoly." du Pont, 351 U.S. at 393. But see International Distribution Centers,
Inc. v. Welsh Trucking Co., Inc., 812 F.2d 786, 791 n.3 (2d Cir.) (" 'Market power' is a
synonym for 'monopoly power. "'), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987).
21 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1989). This section of the Sherman Act states that
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize ... shall be deemed guilty of a
felony." Id.
22 Conspiracies to monopolize also fall under Section 2 but generally do not in-
volve monopoly power; rather courts focus on the concerted action of independent enti-
ties intent on achieving monopoly power. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 12, § 14.1, at 433.
Neither the existence of monopoly power nor the probability of achieving it are essential
to establishing a conspiracy. Id. § 14.6, at 439; see also United States v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1961).
23 The mere possession of monopoly power is not illegal under section 2 of the
Sherman Act. This includes monopolies acquired or maintained by superior business
skill, the introduction of a new or superior product, patents, or economic or technologi-
cal efficiency. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 12, § 11.8, at 315. The proposition that not all
monopoly power is illegal dates to 1911 when the Supreme Court held that the Sherman
Act contained no "direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete." Standard Oil
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). To find a monopolist liable for
antitrust violations, courts require a monopolist to take some positive action to acquire
or maintain its position. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 595-96 (1985); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Re-
quiring willful acquisition or maintenance prevents the imposition of antitrust liability
on firms who acquire their monopoly position because of superior business skill, fore-
sight, or acumen, or because they possess a natural monopoly. When firm acquires a
monopoly under these circumstances, it does not intend to place itself in a monopoly
position but rather has a monopoly "thrust upon" it. For a general discussion of the
"thrust upon" defense and cases examining the defense, see 2 E. KINTNER, supra note
12, § 12.14. In addition, section 2 liability requires that the defendant's business activity
involve "trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1982). In general, commerce is "broadly defined and includes almost all
business transactions." 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 12, § 12.1, at 322-23.
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The Supreme Court has only infrequently addressed the offense of
attempted monopolization, 24 but most lower courts that have con-
sidered the offense require that the plaintiff prove three elements:
the defendant's specific intent to acquire monopoly power; anticom-
petitive conduct by the defendant; and a "dangerous probability"
that the defendant will actually acquire monopoly power.25 To es-
tablish a "dangerous probability of success," the plaintiff must show
that the defendant possesses market power, i.e., control over price.
Although courts have not adopted any uniform standard for the de-
gree of market power necessary to find attempted monopolization,
it is clear that the defendant need not possess market power as great
as that necessary for the completed offense of monopolization;
26
24 In one of its more detailed treatments of the attempted monopolization offense,
the Supreme Court approved ajury instruction defining "attempt" as "the employment
of methods, means and practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization,
and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so close as to create a dangerous
probability of it." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946). As
Professor Wentz explains, most attempted monopolization cases reaching the Supreme
Court are accompanied by charges of "completed monopolization, conspiracy to mo-
nopolize, or conspiracy to restrain trade" and thus the attempt charge "has received
only incidental treatment." Wentz, Monopoly Power in Completed and Attempted Monopoliza-
tion Litigation: The Convergence of Law and Economics, 90 DICK. L. REV. 261, 278-79 (1985).
25 E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRUsT LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 497
(1984). The elements required to establish attempted monopolization were derived
from Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), in which the Court stated:
[In] attempts to monopolize... [i]ntent... is essential .... Where acts
are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to
prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require further acts in addi-
tion to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to
bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability
that it will happen. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous
probability exist, [the Sherman Act] directs itself against that dangerous
probability as well as against the completed result.
Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
The majority of lower courts has adopted the requirement of a "dangerous
probability" of success. Wentz, supra note 24, at 279 n.140. The Ninth Circuit stands
virtually alone in not requiring a showing of dangerous probability. Lessig v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). But cf. Cornwell Qual-
ity Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972) (defining elements of attempted monopolization as including "sufficient market
power to come dangerously close to success").
26 As Kintner notes, a plaintiff need not establish that the defendant possesses mo-
nopoly power but "there is little consensus ... as to how [much power is necessary] to
find an attempt." 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 12, § 13.4, at 423 & n.121. Courts have
traditionally relied on market share as a proxy for market power or monopoly power in
antitrust cases. See supra note 11. Thus, courts have held that the market share neces-
sary to show a "dangerous probability" of monopolization is something less than that
necessary to establish the completed offense. See Wentz, supra note 24, at 280 & n.145.
Interestingly, some commentators and at least one court have even questioned
whether market power is required at all for a showing of attempted monopolization.
Professors Sullivan and Hovenkamp suggest that market power in its traditional sense-
the ability to raise price above marginal cost-may be completely unnecessary for an
attempt to monopolize. They argue that a defendant may attempt monopolization by
1989] 197
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rather, the defendant's market power need only be great enough to
create a "dangerous probability" of acquiring monopoly power if its
attempt to monopolize succeeds.
2 7
II
COURT TESTS FOR MARKET POWER AND MONOPOLY POWER
Although courts generally agree that the correct definition of
market power is the ability to raise prices above the competitive
level, 28 differences exist between the Supreme Court and lower
courts regarding the appropriate legal definition of monopoly
power. In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 29 and again in
more recent decisions, 30 the Supreme Court stated that the test for
monopoly power is the "power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion." 3 ' Despite these Supreme Court opinions, however, the lan-
guage of lower court decisions varies. Some courts have employed
the du Pont test,32 while others require that a firm "control prices and
exclude competition." 33 The Tenth Circuit had employed both mo-
nopoly power tests, 34 never explicitly addressing the appropriate-
ness or implications of either test until it decided Shoppin' Bag of
Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos. 35 and Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart Inter-
national Co. 36 In these cases, the Tenth Circuit explicitly considered
lowering the price of its product below the market level in hopes of driving its competi-
tors out of the market and thereafter establishing a monopoly price. E. SULLIVAN & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 498. One court has acknowledged the question of
"whether proof of market power is [ ]necessary" in the situation described by Sullivan
and Hovenkamp. Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 534 n.21
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983).
27 See Wentz, supra note 24, at 280.
28 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
29 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
30 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (affirmingjury decision based on du
Pont test).
31 DuPont, 351 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added); accord Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571; see
also Aspen Shiing, 472 U.S. at 596 n.20.
32 E.g., Smith v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 779 F.2d 1173, 1175 (6th Cir. 1985);
J.A. Croson Corp. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 201 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
and vacated, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d
261, 264 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985); Continental Cablevision v.
American Elec. Power Co., 715 F.2d 1115, 1120 (6th Cir. 1983).
33 White and White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 507 (6th
Cir. 1983) (emphasis added); accord Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 692
F.2d 307, 311 (3rd Cir. 1982); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691
F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982).
34 Compare Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.
1983) ("or" test), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) with E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc.,
525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975) ("and" test), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
35 783 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1986).
36 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
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which monopoly power test was more appropriate and also adopted
a new test for market power.
A. Monopoly Power and Market Power Tests in the Tenth
Circuit
The Tenth Circuit set forth its monopoly power test in Shoppin'
Bag, an attempted monopolization case. 37 The court first noted that
in an attempted monopolization case, the plaintiff must establish the
existence of a "dangerous probability of [the defendant] suc-
cess[fully] ... monopolizing the relevant market."38 The trial court
had instructed the jury that a "dangerous probability" of success
meant "'the probability of attaining the power to control prices in
the market and the power to exclude competition from the mar-
ket.' ,9 Thus, the trial court transformed the "power to control
prices or exclude competition" test of United States v. E.L du Pont de
Nemours & Co.40 into one requiring that the plaintiff prove the exist-
ence of both elements. 4' On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld these
instructions over Shoppin' Bag's objection that requiring it to prove
both the defendant's ability to control prices and exclude competi-
tion incorrectly enlarged its burden of proof. According to the
Shoppin' Bag court, "[T]he [du Pont] opinion ... explains that these
two points are so closely related that they must be treated as one." 42
The court reasoned that it is "conceivable that if a company has ob-
tained control over prices that it still may not have the power to
37 Shoppin' Bag operated a "no frills" grocery warehouse and experienced consid-
erable success competing against other grocery retailers in the Pueblo, Colorado area.
One competitor, Dillon Companies, doing business as King Soopers, reduced prices
significantly in order to avoid substantial losses and to remain competitive with Shoppin'
Bag. King Soopers' price reduction threatened the existence of Shoppin' Bag. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission notified King Soopers that it would investigate its pricing policy.
Shortly thereafter, King Soopers raised its prices and the FTC terminated its investiga-
tion. Shoppin' Bag then filed suit against King Soopers alleging attempted monopoliza-
tion. A jury found King Soopers innocent of the charge. Shoppin' Bag, 783 F.2d at 161.
38 Id. The court also required that the plaintiff prove three additional elements: '(1)
the relevant market in which the alleged attempt occurred; (2) specific intent to monop-
olize; and (3) conduct in furtherance of an attempt to monopolize. Id.
39 Id. at 162 (quoting trial court) (emphasis added). The trial judge further noted
that the defendant must possess " 'market strength [i.e., market power] that approaches
monopoly power'" in order to establish a dangerous probability of success in achieving
actual monopoly power. Id. According to the trial judge, a firm's "market strength" is
in part indicated by the firm's market share but" '[m]arket share alone... is not enough
[and o]ther factors [to] consider include the number and strength of the defendant's
competitors, the difficulty or ease of entry into the market by new competitors, con-
sumer sensitivity to change in prices, innovations or developments in the market,
whether the defendant is a multimarket firm, as well as other evidence presented [that is]
persuasive regarding defendant's market strength.'" Id. (citation omitted).
40 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
41 Shoppin' Bag, 783 F.2d at 162.
42 Id. at 163.
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exclude other competitors from the market," as it asserted was the
case in du Pont.43 Therefore monopoly power, according to the
Tenth Circuit, requires the presence of both elements.
44
In Westman, a refusal-to-deal case 45 brought under section 1 of
the Sherman Act,46 the Tenth Circuit reiterated its monopoly power
test and distinguished market power from monopoly power.47 As
part of the refusal-to-deal case, the Tenth Circuit required the plain-
tiff to prove, as one of the elements of its case that the defendant
possessed market power sufficient to enable it to harm consumers.
48
The court departed from the traditional definition of market
power49 and held that market power was either the " 'power to con-
trol prices' or 'the power to exclude competition.' "50
B. The Legal Basis for the Tenth Circuit's Monopoly Power
Test
The Shoppin' Bag court correctly noted that du Pont specifically
recognized that "these two points [control over prices and the
power to exclude competition] are so closely related that they must
be treated as one." 51 But the Shoppin' Bag court failed to acknowl-
edge that the du Pont Court also stated that "[p]rice and competition
are so intimately entwined that any discussion ... must treat them as
one." 52 Moreover, the du Pont Court further noted that "[i]t is in-
conceivable that price could be controlled without power over com-
petition or vice versa," 53 implying that a firm lacks power to raise
prices unless it can also prevent competitors from capturing its
share of sales when the firm raises prices. Thus, the du Pont Court
evidently believed that no firm possesses one element of the Court's
monopoly power test without simultaneously possessing the other
and hence the presence of one element of its test indicated the pres-
ence of the other. Under du Pont, then, proving that the defendant
firm possesses either control over prices or the ability to exclude
43 Id. at 164.
44 Id.
45 The plaintiff in Westman charged that Hobart, a kitchen equipment manufacturer,
denied the plaintiff the right to distribute Hobart products and claimed that this denial
was part of a conspiracy between Hobart and Nobel, Inc., one of its distributors, to
prevent the plaintiff from competing with Nobel. Westman, 796 F.2d at 1219-20.
46 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
47 Westman, 796 F.2d at 1225 n.3.
48 Id. at 1225-28.
49 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
50 Westman, 796 F.2d at 1226 n.3 (citing Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v.
NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
51 Shoppin'Bag, 783 F.2d at 163.





competition establishes that the defendant has monopoly power.
Thus, under this analysis of the du Pont Court's opinion, the plain-
tiff, Shoppin' Bag, properly, asserted that the trial court incorrectly
stated its burden of proof by requiring it to prove both elements
rather than just one.
The Shoppin' Bag court further supported its position that both
elements are required, by noting that "du Pont had power to con-
trol prices in cellophane but ... the company lacked the power to
exclude competition from the relevant market" and "[t]herefore, du
Pont was not found to possess the requisite market [i.e., monopoly]
power even though it possessed one of the elements [and thus] both
elements are required."' 54 But in fact, neither element was present
in du Pont. As to du Pont's power to control prices, the Court ex-
plained that "the '[g]reat sensitivity of customers ... to price ...'
prevented du Pont from possessing monopoly control over price" 55
and thus the Government's proof failed to establish that element of
the monopoly power test. After considering whether the Govern-
ment had shown that du Pont possessed the power to exclude com-
petitors from the relevant market, the Court concluded that "there
is no proof du Pont ever has possessed power to exclude any [com-
petitors] from the [relevant] market." 56 Thus, even after finding
that du Pont lacked the power to control prices, the Court pro-
ceeded to consider whether du Pont possessed the power to exclude
54 Shoppin' Bag, 783 F.2d at 163.
55 Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 400 (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
118 F. Supp. 41, 207 (D. Del. 1953), aft'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956)). The du Pont Court also
stated that "[wie cannot say that... du Pont [had] monopoly power over prices in view
of the [lower court's] findings of fact." Id. at 401.
56 Id. at 403. The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of du Pont's control over prices
perhaps resulted from a misunderstanding of the du Pont Court's discussion of product
differentiation. The Circuit's interpretation may have stemmed from the statement in du
Pont that "du Pont's power to set the price of cellophane has been limited only by the
competition afforded by other flexible packaging materials [and] it may be practically
impossible for anyone to commence manufacturing cellophane without full access to du
Pont's [cellophane production] technique." Id. at 392. The Court explained the import
of its statement by noting that as product differentiation increases, a producer's power
over price and competition increases but noted that "this power... is not the power that
makes an illegal monopoly." Id. at 393. Thus, the Court recognized that although many
producers have some degree of control over price, not all such control constituted mo-
nopoly control over price for antitrust liability purposes. Any control du Pont had over
the price of cellophane because its product was differentiated from other flexible wrap-
ping materials was acceptable to the Court. Id.
In reality, the Court probably underestimated du Pont's control over the price of its
product. The Court placed major emphasis on the cross-elasticity of demand for cello-
phane, that is, the effect of an increase in the price of cellophane on the demand for
other wrapping materials. But the Court misunderstood the relevance of the cross-elas-
ticity measure and probably incorrectly concluded that du Pont had no control over
price. For a discussion of this point, see R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 12, at
359-62.
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competitors from the relevant market. If proof of both elements
were necessary for a showing of monopoly power, then the Court's
analysis could have ended when it concluded that du Pont lacked
control over prices. By also considering whether du Pont could ex-
clude competition, the Court implied that its test for monopoly
power requires that the defendant possess one element or the other,
but not both as the Tenth Circuit concluded.
57
C. The Legal Basis of the Tenth Circuit's Market Power Test
The Tenth Circuit's market power test, as set forth in Westman
was based on a puzzling interpretation of precedent. The Westman
court first acknowledged that " '[m]arket power is the ability to raise
prices above those that would be charged in a competitive mar-
ket,' "58 the standard test for market power recognized by the
Supreme Court.59 But it then stated that market power can be
"demonstrated" by showing that the defendant has "either 'power to
control prices' or 'the power to exclude competition,' -60 thereby ef-
fectively adopting the du Pont monopoly power test as its test for
market power.61 For its required showing for market power, the
Tenth Circuit cited its own decision in Board of Regents v. NCAA, 62 a
case whose holding the Supreme Court later affirmed63 without ref-
erence to the Tenth Circuit's method for demonstrating market
power. Rather, in referring to market power, the Supreme Court
employed the standard definition, that is, the ability to raise prices
above those charged in a competitive market. 64 The Tenth Circuit's
57 The du Pont decision may admit of some ambiguity, if not contradiction, as to
whether a defendant need possess both elements to have monopoly power. By noting
that "[i]t is inconceivable that price could be controlled without power over competition
or vice versa," du Pont, 351 U.S. at 392, the Court certainly implies that a firm with one
element will perforce have the other and that the presence of both elements will allow an
assumption of monopoly power. But that is different than saying that a firm must have
both elements or holding that a plaintiff need prove both elements in order to establish
monopoly power. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why the Court would twice
state that a firm must possess one element or the other and reiterate the test for monop-
oly power as the possession of one element or the other in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), and United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563 (1966), unless it meant to allow proof of one element or the other as sufficient
evidence of monopoly power.
58 Westman, 796 F.2d at 1225 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
59 Specifically, the quoted definition appears at Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109
n.38.
60 796 F.2d at 1225 n.3 (citing Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1158
(10th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
61 For discussion of the du Pont monopoly power test, see supra text accompanying
note 31.
62 707 F.2d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
65 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
64 Id. at 109 n.38.
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reliance on Board of Regents v. NCAA is also misplaced because the
Board of Regents v. NCAA court cites du Pont as authority for its market




AN INDEPENDENT RATIONALE FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT TESTS
Even if the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted existing precedent for
its monopoly and market power tests, the question remains whether
its tests have independent rationales that make the tests useful. To
reflect the economic principles underlying market control, a good
monopoly power test should accurately differentiate between mo-
nopoly power and market power and a good market power test
should distinguish between market power and the absence thereof.
In addition, the application of the tests should further the goals of
the antitrust laws.
A. The Economics of Monopoly Power and Market Power
Economists generally define market power as the ability of a
firm to raise the price of its product by restricting output.6 6 How
much a firm can raise its price depends on the structure of the mar-
ket in which it competes. A firm in a perfectly competitive market67
cannot raise its price for any non-negligible length of time because a
large number of other firms sell perfect substitutes for its product.
When the perfectly competitive firm restricts its output in an at-
tempt to raise the price of its product above the market level, con-
sumers switch to the output of other firms. As a result, the firm
reducing its output simply loses sales without affecting the market
price of its product. In sum, the firm possesses no market power.68
A firm with market power can set the price of its output above
the price that would prevail in a perfectly competitive market.69 In
65 In Board of Regents, the Tenth Circuit recites the du Pont monopoly power test but
labels it a test for market power. 707 F.2d at 1158. The district court specifically em-
ployed a monopoly power test in the initial phase of the litigation because the issue was
whether the NCAA had monopoly power in the college football television market. Board
of Regents, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1323 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aft'd in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), aft'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
66 R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 110 (1985); see also M. HOWARD,
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION 7-8 (1983); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUC-
TURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 11 (2d ed. 1980).
67 For a general discussion of firm behavior in competitive markets see R. BLAIR &
D. KASERMAN, supra note 66, at 3-22.
68 See P. ASCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 9-10 (rev. ed.
1983).
69 See Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 939.
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reality, most firms can raise their prices some amount simply be-
cause no perfect substitutes exist for their products. 70 The extreme
example of a firm with the ability to raise the price of its output is a
pure monopolist. 71 The pure monopolist can raise prices substan-
tially above the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket not only because there are no perfect substitutes for the firm's
product, but also because by assumption there are not even any
close substitutes. 72 Economists sometimes refer to the monopolist's
substantial control over price as monopoly power.73 Thus, the abil-
ity to control prices varies between the extremes of a perfectly com-
petitive firm and a monopolist.
A firm with some non-negligible power to raise price possesses
what economists sometimes term market power, while a firm with
substantial power to raise price possesses what economists some-
times term monopoly power. Economists, however, often use the
terms market power and monopoly power interchangeably,74 as they
are generally less concerned about labelling the ability of a firm to
raise price than they are with the firm's exercise of its power. Econ-
omists prefer to focus on the exercise of market power or monopoly
power because when output prices rise above the level that would
prevail in a competitive market, resource misallocation results. If
the price of output exceeds the marginal cost of production, as can
occur when a firm raises the price above the competitive level, then
consumers not only pay more for the output produced than they
would in a competitive market, but a portion of their demand for the
product is left unsatisfied in the sense that consumers are willing to
pay more for additional units of output than it costs to produce
them.75 The profit-maximizing decision of the firm with market
70 Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 20; see also F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN &J. GREENWOOD,
FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM 20 (1983).
71 For a general discussion of monopoly, see R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note
66, at 25-35.
72 M. HOWARD, supra note 66, at 7.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 78-79.
74 See, e.g., R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 66, at 110-16 (defining market
power and then proceeding with discussion of methods by which monopoly power can
measured); F. SCHERER, supra note 66, at 11-12 (noting that pure monopolists, oligo-
polists, and monopolistic competitors all possess "monopoly power or market power"
and that sellers in perfectly competitive market possess no monopoly (as opposed to
market) power).
75 Even though a firm with market power raises prices above the competitive mar-
ket level, no consumer pays more than he or she is willing to pay because no consumer is
forced to purchase the firm's product. Thus, high prices are not the problem with mo-
nopoly behavior except to the extent that they redistribute income from buyers to sellers
in the form of monopoly profits. See P. AsCH, supra note 68, at 15-16, 29. Rather, the
problem with a monopolist is that it produces too little output, output that is valued
more highly than the cost of producing it. See F. SCHERER, supra note 66, at 17.
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power creates what economists term an efficiency loss 76 because it
distorts the use of resources in the economy. 77 Eliminating these
distortions tends to improve resource allocation and makes consum-
ers better off.78 For economists, the interesting and relevant issue is
how much market or monopoly power a firm possesses and the size
of the efficiency losses that the exercise of that power generates.
Unlike courts, economists need not draw lines distinguishing be-
tween degrees of control over price. And even though the econo-
mist's theoretical constructs aid in understanding the concept of
market power or monopoly power, they provide less guidance on
how to decide the antitrust litigation issues that courts confront,
that is, deciding whether a firm possesses monopoly power, market
power, or no power at all.
Nonetheless, an instructive correspondence exists between the
legal definitions of market and monopoly power and economic mod-
els of market structure. In particular, the legal concept of monopoly
power corresponds roughly to the economist's concept of substan-
tial control over price, an amount associated with a firm possessing
control approaching that of a pure monopolist.79 When courts refer
to market power, they refer to some nontrivial amount of control
over price less than the power a monopolist possesses.80 The judi-
cial concept corresponds to the economists' notion of a firm with
power over price somewhere between the extremes of a perfectly
76 Efficiency losses, sometimes termed deadweight welfare losses, are the sum of
consumer and producer surplus lost when a firm or firms fail to expand production to
the point where marginal cost equals the price of output. K. CLARKSON & R. MILLER,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 122-24 (1982).
Consumer surplus is the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for the
product and the amount he or she actually pays in the market. lId at 121. Producer
surplus is the difference between what a producer would accept for a unit of output and
what he or she actually receives for it when selling in the market. Id. at 121-22. Both
consumer and producer surplus are measured in dollars. In general, the computation of
efficiency losses involves some difficult theoretical and empirical issues. For an ad-
vanced treatment of the subject, see Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 Am.
ECON. REV. 589 (1976). For slightly less rigorous treatments of efficiency losses, see
Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 991-96 and Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1809-12 (1982).
77 Distortions occur when resources are not allocated to their highest valued uses.
For example, a monopolist creates allocative inefficiency in the use of resources by
charging prices that exceed the cost of production. See M. HOWARD, supra note 66, at 7-
8. Consumers (and society) would be better off with more production of the good be-
cause its value exceeds the cost. See P. ASCI, supra note 68, at 29. Thus, monopolists
devote too few resources to the production of the goods they produce and those re-
sources are then shifted in the economy to the production of less valued goods.
78 Consumers are made better off by the combination of increased output and
lower prices. The increase in consumer surplus measures the extent to which consum-
ers are made better off. See supra note 76.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10, and notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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competitive firm and a monopolist.8 '
As a practical matter, the focus in those antitrust cases that turn
on the presence or absence of market power is not on whether a
firm possesses market power, but rather on how much market power
the firm possesses. 82 Firms with inconsequential amounts of market
power are unable to cause any significant anticompetitive harm in
the market 83 because when they attempt to raise prices, they lose
sales to competitors as consumers switch to lower-priced substi-
tutes.84 Thus, courts do not concern themselves with the mere
existence of market power but rather with whether the amount of
power possesses is nontrivial.
85
B. The Economic Content of the Legal Tests for Monopoly
and Market Power
Ideally, legal tests for market power and monopoly power
would incorporate and reflect the economic theory underlying these
concepts so that antitrust liability is imposed only where harmful
efficiency losses result from allegedly anticompetitive behavior.
Professors Landes and Posner8 6 and Professor Schmalensee 87 have
analyzed the economic content of the du Pont monopoly power test 88
and, taken in combination, their work indicates that the two ele-
ments of the test, the power to control price and the power to ex-
clude competition, reflect a distinction between short-run and long-
run control of the market. Furthermore, they suggest that the ex-
tent of a firm's control over the market is properly measured by the
81 See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
82 These cases include those involving mergers arising under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), and those cases brought under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), and considered under the Rule of Reason. See supra notes 12-
13 & 17 and accompanying text.
83 Firms may injure some consumers or other firms or may harm themselves by
attempting to raise prices. But the market will automatically correct the firm's behavior
when consumers switch to firms offering better bargains. See supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text.
84 Many firms have the power to raise their prices some small amount. A manufac-
turer may exploit the characteristics that differentiate its product from those of competi-
tors. The fewer and less suitable the substitutes, the more the firm can raise its prices.
For example, a producer of washing machines may be able to raise the price of its prod-
uct by a few dollars simply because it has some feature that its competitors do not install
on their machines. And with this small price rise, the firm probably need not worry that
consumers will switch to the products of its competitors. But the firm cannot increase its
prices with impunity because at some point, after some additional price increase, the
firm will begin to lose sales to its competitors. Thus, although the manufacturer has
market power, it is too trivial in amount to constitute the degree of market power neces-
sary as an element in an antitrust action. See P. ASCH, supra note 68, at 135-38.
85 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 939; Schmalensee, supra note 76, at 1790.
86 Landes & Posner, supra note 8.
87 Schmalensee, supra note 76.
88 See supra text accompanying note 19.
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efficiency losses the firm creates.8 9 Thus, the theoretically appropri-
ate legal tests would allow a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defend-
ant's short-run and long-run control of the market create efficiency
losses indicative of market power or monopoly power.90
As noted, the traditional test of monopoly power formulated by
the Supreme Court requires that the plaintiff show either the power
to control prices or to exclude competition.9 1 Professors Landes
and Posner note that the first part of the test seems equivalent to the
economist's definition of market power.92 But they profess puzzle-
ment over the second element of the test, suggesting that perhaps
the Court meant merely to make "the corollary point that any firm
that has and exercises the power to raise price above the competitive
level must also be able to exclude entrants" in order to maintain the
price increase.93 Alternatively, they suggest that the Court may
have recognized that a firm with monopoly power could lower the
monopoly price to the competitive level and thereby exclude other
less efficient firms that enter the market under "the 'umbrella' that a
monopoly price holds over the competitive fringe in the market." 94
As a final explanation, they suggest that the Court may have been
concerned that the monopolist has power to exclude other equally
efficient firms by predatory pricing or other exclusionary practices.95
89 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 952-55; Schmalensee, supra note 76, at 1792.
Both Landes & Posner and Schmalensee use the term deadweight loss rather than effi-
ciency loss. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts
would actually implement monopoly power and market power tests based on efficiency
losses.
91 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
92 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 977. Landes and Posner refer to the du Pont
monopoly power test as a test for market power. In general, economists use the terms
market power and monopoly power interchangeably, see supra notes 79-79 and accompa-
nying text, but as legal concepts, monopoly power and market power are distinct and
each has its own separate test. See supra Section II.
93 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 977.
94 Id. A firm capable of raising the market price creates opportunities for other
firms in the market to raise their prices if they so desire. Economists believe that the
"umbrella" of a higher price occurs in markets where a dominant firm and numerous
other smaller firms exist. In a market with this structure, the dominant firm establishes a
price above the competitive level and the smaller firms take that price as given in the
same way that they would treat the price as given in a competitive market. In this kind of
market, dominated by one firm, all firms enjoy positive economic profits and for these
profits to continue, entry must be restricted. Whether market behavior of this kind actu-
ally exists is the subject of some doubt. For general discussions of the dominant firm
model, see P. AsCH, supra note 68, at 67-68 and F. SCHERER, supra note 66, at 232-36.
95 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 977. A firm practicing predatory pricing sells
its output in several markets and in some of those markets the firm is assumed to have
monopoly power. In the remaining markets, where the firm lacks monopoly power, the
firm practices "predatory pricing," i.e., it sells its output below cost in hopes of driving
its competitors out of business. The firm attempts to offset the losses suffered in the
markets where it sets price below cost with the profits the firm derived in those markets
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Professor Schmalensee argues that the du Pont test recognizes
that a firm may have short-run and long-run 96 control of the mar-
ket.97 He notes that in the short run, a finn exercises control of the
market equivalent to market power if it can raise prices for some
period of time long enough to make it profitable to do so; over the
longer run, in order to maintain the price increase, a firm must
somehow prevent competing firms from offering output at lower
prices.98 The ability to maintain the price increase in the short run
depends on whether existing firms can successfully compete against
the firm exercising market power by increasing production of suffi-
ciently close substitutes using their existing production capacity. In
the l9ng run, new or existing competitors can increase the output of
close substitutes by expanding their production capacity. Thus, a
firm's ability to exercise long-run market power depends on its abil-
ity to deter successfully the development of additional production
capacity.
Although Professors Landes and Posner and Professor
Schmalensee differ somewhat in their assessments of the Court's
monopoly power test, their analyses are not irreconcilable. Landes
and Posner define market power as the ability to raise and maintain
in which it exercises monopoly power. Once having driven its rivals from the remaining
markets, the firm establishes monopoly prices and earns monopoly profits. For a critical
assessment of the predatory pricing model, see R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note
12, at 680-89. For a judicial analysis of predatory pricing, see Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-93 (1986).
96 Economists consider the long run as that period of time in which all inputs, in-
cluding plant capacity, are variable. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMiC THEORY AND OPER-
ATIONS ANALYSIS 290 (4th ed. 1977). In contrast, some inputs are fixed in the short run.
Most important among the fixed inputs is plant capacity because developing new capac-
ity is the primary method by which output expands.
97 Schmalensee, supra note 76, at 1795. Although Schmalensee finds "nothing
wrong with [the du Pont monopoly power] definition," id., his statement must be inter-
preted in light of the focus of his analysis, which is the efficiency losses caused by a firm's
ability to control prices in the long run and the short run. Because he deals generally
with "market power" and does not deal with the separate and distinct legal concept of
"monopoly power," he does not directly address the question of whether a plaintiff
should prove only one or both elements of the du Pont test. Nonetheless, his analysis
provides useful insight as to whether the existence of one or both elements is sufficient
to prove monopoly power in a legal context.
98 The need to exclude competitors arises because a firm exercising market power
earns positive economic profits by pricing its output above marginal (and average) cost
and these profits attract other competitors into the market. As entry occurs, output
increases and prices fall. P. AsCH, supra note 68, at 11. Unless the firm can deter entry it
will not enjoy positive profits for a period of time longer than that required for new
firms to establish production capacity and/or the time required for existing firms to
increase output. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 66, at 32. Thus, a firm may
enjoy positive economic profits in short run but if entry by new firms occurs in the long
run, the production of output expands and the price of output falls, eliminating excess
profits. P. AscH, supra note 68, at 9-13.
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the higher-than-competitive price by restricting output.99 This defi-
nition, which corresponds to the traditional legal definition of mar-
ket power,'0 0 does not explicitly distinguish between long-run and
short-run market power and thus they are puzzled by the Court's
"corollary point"'' regarding the exclusion of competitors. Possi-
bly Landes and Posner have implicitly assumed that a firm with the
capacity to raise the price of its output has already excluded both its
long-run and short-run competition in which case neither existing
firms nor potential entrants into the market can reduce the firm's
control over price. Although this overlooks the important differ-
ences between the long run and the short run pointed out by
Schmalensee, 10 2 this would eliminate the differences between their
analyses. Thus, the interpretation of the Court's du Pont test by
Landes and Posner implicitly focuses on the exercise of long-run
market power whereas Schmalensee distinguishes explicitly between
short-run and long-run market power.
Regardless of their analyses of du Pont, Landes and Posner and
Schmalensee agree that efficiency losses are the theoretically correct
measure of the deleterious effects associated with the exercise of
market power.10 3 Taken together, their studies indicate that con-
centrating on the efficiency losses arising from the exercise of either
short-run or long-run market control correctly assesses the firm's
impact on the allocation of resources and consumer welfare.' 04
Thus, in an antitrust case requiring a party to prove the existence of
either market power or monopoly power, a court could theoretically
allow the party to establish the existence of such power by showing
that the sum of the efficiency losses associated with short-run and
long-run control of the market rises to the level indicative of mo-
nopoly or market power.
Although a test for market or monopoly power based on effi-
ciency losses would provide a more accurate guide for assessing the
anticompetitive impact of a challenged business practice, imple-
99 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 937.
100 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
101 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 977.
102 Schmalensee, supra note 76, at 1793-96.
103 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 952-55; Schmalensee, supra note 76, at 1792.
104 For a general discussion of the estimation of efficiency losses, see Landes & Pos-
ner, supra note 8, at 952-56; see also supra note 76. Professor Schmalensee provides a
method for appropriately discounting and weighing short-run and long-run efficiency
losses assuming that market power declines exponentially over time. The total efficiency
(or deadweight loss) is TDW = [1/r][(rDWs + BDW)/(r + 8)]. Schmalensee, supra
note 76, at 1794. TDW is the total efficiency loss, r is the interest rate at which the losses
are discounted to present value, 8 is the rate at which market power exponentially de-
clines, and DWs and DWL are the short-run and long-run reductions of consumer plus
producer surplus.
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menting such a test is impractical.' 0 5 First, the plaintiff faces the
difficult task of actually estimating the magnitude of the efficiency
losses.'0 6 Moreover, even if the efficiency losses could be easily and
accurately estimated, a court would still have to decide whether the
losses meet the legal standard for monopoly power, market power,
or are so trivial that antitrust liability is inappropriate. Making this
determination requires courts to establish threshold levels of effi-
ciency losses for the various degrees of market control. 10 7 Because
control over price varies in degree, courts will find no "bright-line"
tests that allow them to differentiate objectively among monopoly
power, market power, and the trivial amount of control over price
that does not subject a firm to liability under the antitrust laws.
Thus, such an approach is of little practical value.
IV
AN EVALUATION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S CONTRIBUTION
Although measuring efficiency losses is difficult and does not in
and of itself provide courts with "bright-line" distinctions among
105 For a discussion of some of the intricate problems encountered in measuring
efficiency losses, see F. SCHERER, supra note 66, at 459-64.
106 Plaintiffs would have to estimate both lost consumer and producer surplus, and
accurate estimation of these quantities is difficult. See supra note 76. For suggestions on
how to estimate efficiency losses using data perhaps more readily available, see Landes
& Posner, supra note 8, at 983-96, and Schmalensee, supra note 76, at 1790-93, 1809-10.
107 Economic theory provides no useful standards for'setting these thresholds be-
cause control over price varies continuously, with no objectively determinable levels at
which to set the dollar value of efficiency losses for monopoly power or market power.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-73. Drawing these distinctions (between negligible
power and market power and between market power and monopoly power) involves
difficult policy questions that courts are probably ill-suited to answer. Setting threshold
levels of efficiency losses requires a decision as to the size of the efficiency losses that
society will tolerate. For example, allowing a firm to exercise its power to raise the price
of its product some small fraction of a percent above the price that would exist in a
competitive market may not be worth condemning even when accompanied by allegedly
anticompetitive behavior because the benefits derived from eliminating this power are
too small compared to the cost in judicial resources necessary to eliminate the efficiency
loss. Of course, courts implicitly set efficiency loss thresholds every time they decide an
antitrust case involving market power or monopoly power because imposing liability for
a firm's allegedly anticompetitive behavior necessarily requires deciding whether the
firm possesses the required power. But setting "thresholds" in this manner is a less
troublesome proposition than requiring that plaintiffs and defendants submit estimates
of efficiency losses.
Some economists argue that in some situations consumers are not harmed even
when firms exercise some relatively sizeable degree of control over price. They argue
that the theory of monopolistic competition demonstrates that firms offering variety can
differentiate their products and thus can raise prices above marginal costs only because
consumers value variety. In this situation, it is not clear that the exercise of market
power is undesirable. E.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 66, at 24. In addition, establishing an
efficiency loss threshold low enough to impose liability for such minimal exercises of
market power inevitably means that more conduct falls within the range of antitrust
sanctions and more judicial resources are devoted to the resolution of antitrust claims.
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different degrees of control over price, the underlying theory pro-
vides a useful framework for evaluating market power and monop-
oly power tests. And even though neither of the Tenth Circuit's
tests are adequate under the efficiency losses criterion, the Tenth
Circuit's monopoly power test is of practical value to courts. The
Tenth Circuit's market power test, however, proves to be unreliable.
A. Validity of the Tests Under the Efficiency Loss Criterion
The Tenth Circuit's monopoly power test in Shoppin' Bag of
Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., o108 requires a plaintiff to prove the existence
of both elements of the du Pont Court's test by demonstrating the
defendant's control over price and its ability to exclude competi-
tion.10 9 Even if these two elements are taken to represent short-run
and long-run market power, however, Professor Schmalensee's the-
oretical analysis suggests that the efficiency losses are not necessar-
ily so large that they rise to the judicially defined threshold for
monopoly power. 110 And even short-run market power alone con-
ceivably could create efficiency losses so large that they surpass the
theoretical threshold that might define monopoly power on the ba-
sis of efficiency losses. The Tenth Circuit's requirement that the
plaintiff prove that both elements exist fails to recognize explicitly
these possibilities."' In fact, the du Pont test itself is subject to the
same criticism because the existence of one element or the other
does not necessarily imply efficiency losses of any particular size.
The Tenth Circuit's test for market power offered in Westman
Commission Co. v. Hobart International Co. 1 12 accepts the traditional
definition of market power as "'the ability to raise prices above
those that would be charged in a competitive market' "113 but allows
the plaintiff to "demonstrate 'market power' " by showing "evi-
108 783 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1986).
109 Id at 164.
110 Whether a firm possesses market power or monopoly power depends on the
level at which thresholds are set. The lower the threshold, the smaller the efficiency loss
and the less control over price a firm needs in order to meet any legal standard for
monopoly power or market power.
1 I Schmalensee notes that a firm without any long-run market power may still war-
rant antitrust action. He cites the prescription drug industry as a case in point. If no
entry barriers inhibit the development and marketing of new prescription drugs, then
persistent excess profits will not be present in the industry as a whole. But because of
their ability to patent drug formulas, individual firms may have considerable control
over price and also may be capable of imposing substantial efficiency losses in the rela-
tively short run, that is, before their patents run out. Schmalensee, supra note 76, at
1795-96. Depending on how low the threshold is set, these losses could rise to the
threshold level defining monopoly power and thus potentially result in antitrust liability.
112 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
113 Id. at 1225 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
109 n.38 (1984)).
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dence of either 'power to control prices' or 'the power to exclude
competition.' "114 Like the Tenth Circuit's monopoly power test,
this test also fails to acknowledge the theoretical possibility that the
efficiency loss generated by some combination of long-run and
short-run market power, not just one or the other, can combine to
justify imposing liability once the additional element of anticompeti-
tive behavior is proven."15
B. The Tenth Circuit's Tests as Practical Guides
1. Monopoly Power
In practice, estimating efficiency losses is extremely difficult and
would require substantial resources. 116 However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's monopoly power test provides a workable alternative that cor-
relates with economic theory. By requiring that a monopolist have
both control over price and the ability to exclude competition, the
Tenth Circuit implicitly recognized that this combination of power
gives the monopolist greater potential for harming consumers than
is possible when the firm merely possesses control over price or the
ability to exclude competition. 117 It is more likely that a firm able to
control price and exclude competitors for some period of time will
create efficiency losses corresponding to those theoretically associ-
ated with the exercise of monopoly power. On balance, courts using
the Tenth Circuit's test will be more likely to distinguish monopoly
power from mere market power.
81 8
114 Id. at 1226 n.3.
115 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of mar-
ket power in antitrust cases.
116 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts
would actually implement monopoly power and market power tests based on efficiency
losses and the problems involved in doing so. Landes and Posner suggest a method for
estimating market power based on supply and demand elasticities. They show that their
measure of market power correlates to efficiency losses, Landes & Posner, supra note 8,
at 991, but they note that even these elasticities are "not easily determinable (at least by
the methods of litigation)," id. at 956, and thus they realize that there are difficult
problems "that would face a court or enforcement agency in... using [this] approach."
Id. at 943.
117 Under Schmalensee's efficiency loss analysis, a firm that has control only over
price, i.e., short-run market power, will see its profits eroded in the long run because it
cannot prevent other firms from entering the market and increasing the supply of out-
put. The lack of long-run control will likely, though not conclusively, create smaller
efficiency losses than those attributable to a firm with both control over price and the
ability to exclude. See Schmalensee, supra note 76, at 1793.
118 An implicit distinction exists between a monopolist defined by the size of the
efficiency loss it creates and a monopolist defined by the Tenth Circuit test. Defining a
monopolist by the level of efficiency loss means that some combination of short-run and
long-run market power, as Schmalensee defines those terms, Schmalensee, supra note
76, at 1793-96, can result in a firm being labelled a "monopolist" even though it might
actually have no ability to exclude competition and impose long-run efficiency losses.
Depending on the level of efficiency losses chosen by courts as indicative of monopoly
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Requiring that a defendant have the ability to exclude competi-
tors acknowledges the distinction in economic theory between a mo-
nopolist and a firm with substantially less control over the market,
namely that a monopolist lacks competitors offering substitute prod-
ucts even in the long run, and even though the monopolist earns
positive economic profits.119 In this respect, the Tenth Circuit's
monopoly power test is superior to the du Pont Court's test.
2. Market Power
In theory, the correct test for market power should also focus
on the magnitude of efficiency losses. But employing a market
power test based on efficiency losses is no less difficult than employ-
ing an efficiency test for monopoly power.1 20
Alternatively, a court can draw upon economic theory for gui-
dance in distinguishing among firms with mere market power, firms
possessing monopoly power, and firms having no market power at
all. In economic theory, what distinguishes pure monopolists from
other firms is the absence of competition that they face even in the
long run.' 2 1 The distinguishing feature of firms without market
power, on the other hand, is that they have no ability to raise prices
above the level prevailing in the market. Thus, as an alternative to
the impractical estimation of efficiency losses, a court's market
power test might focus on a firm's ability to raise prices in the short
run and on whether it is able to exclude competition in the long run.
On this basis, the Tenth Circuit's market power test is only par-
tially adequate. In Westman, the court properly allowed the plaintiff
to show that the defendant's control over the market is less than that
of a monopolist, and also acknowledged the traditional legal and
scholarly definition of market power as the ability to raise prices
above the competitive level. 122 The court further stated that a
"lesser showing should be required" to establish market power than
that necessary to establish monopoly power because a firm "may
possess the ability to sustain a supra-competitive price for its prod-
power, they could find that many firms are monopolists. On the other hand, the Tenth
Circuit test is not based explicitly on efficiency losses but instead focuses on the character-
istics associated with the theoretical model of a monopolist in economic theory. Implic-
itly, the Tenth Circuit's test assumes that if a firm possesses the characteristics of control
over price and the ability to exclude competitors, then there is a stronger probability
than there otherwise would be that the efficiency losses the firm creates meet or exceed
the threshold defining monopoly power, even if the courts have not explicitly defined
that threshold.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
120 See supra notes 105-07 for a discussion of the mechanics of implementing a mar-
ket power test based on efficiency losses.
121 See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 66, at 31.
122 796 F.2d at 1225 & n.3.
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ucts, even though the [firm] does not have the direct power to ex-
clude competitors."'' 23 But the court's market power test, which
allows a plaintiff to "demonstrate 'market power' [by] show[ing] evi-
dence of either 'power to control prices' or 'the power to exclude
competition,' "124 can lead to an incorrect conclusion. Allowing a
plaintiff to prove market power by demonstrating the defendant's
ability to control the price of output is analytically correct; but per-
mitting proof of market power by a demonstration of the defend-
ant's ability to exclude competition is analytically incorrect because
the ability to exclude does not always imply the ability to raise the
price of output and thus does not imply that a firm will harm
consumers.
A firm with control over price does not necessarily have the
ability to exclude competitors. For example, the first firm to enter a
market with a new and different product has control over price be-
cause no competitors produce viable substitutes. But control over
price, in and of itself, does not permit the exclusion of competitors
from the market and, in time, control over price will diminish be-
cause the firm's profits attract entrants and the resulting competi-
tion erodes the firm's power.' 25 Thus, permitting a showing of
control over price will correctly indicate the presence of market
power, as traditionally defined, but will not necessarily imply that a
firm possesses monopoly power.
Allowing a plaintiff to prove market power by demonstrating
only the power to exclude competition is also problematic. Gener-
ally, such power is associated with the exercise of long-run control
over price and monopoly.' 26 But, the ability to exclude competitors
does not necessarily carry with it the power to raise prices above the
established market level. For example, suppose a group of doctors
practice a particular specialty in a hospital and collectively they exer-
cise the power to admit other doctors to practice that specialty in
123 Id. at 1226 n.3. It is unclear exactly what the court meant by "direct" power to
exclude competitors. The court suggests that entry barriers such as high capital costs,
patents or copyrights are not "direct" restrictions on entry because they are independ-
ent of a single firm's ability to exclude competition. Id. However, this proposition and
the distinction it attempts to draw are without support in the existing case law and legal
literature. Thus, the court's attempt to distinguish firms on the basis of their "direct"
power to exclude competitors remains unclear as does the import of such a distinction.
124 Id.
125 Professor Schmalensee cites the example of Wilkinson Sword's coated, stainless
steel, double-edged razor blades. For about a year, Wilkinson Sword was the only seller
of such blades in the United States and presumably had some control over price. But
whatever control it may have had was reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by the entry of
other competitors. Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust. The
ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994, 1005 (1979).
126 A monopolist has no competitors even in the long run and thus it can maintain a
higher-than-competitive price. See M. HOWARD, supra note 66, at 7-8.
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the hospital. Although the doctors have the power to exclude
others from that hospital, they will not necessarily have any power
to harm consumers. The other doctors could continue to offer their
services either independently or through other hospitals, thereby
providing choices for consumers and generating effective price com-
petition. Thus, the doctors' ability to exclude competitors does not
imply the ability to control price.
Westman itself illustrates a situation where the ability to exclude
competition fails to establish the ability to injure consumers by con-
trolling price. In Westman the defendant manufacturer, Hobart, con-
trolled the number of distributorships handling its products. 127 The
plaintiff alleged that Nobel, Inc., one of Hobart's distributors, re-
quested that Hobart not deal with Westman, that Hobart illegally
complied with that request, 128 and that Hobart was guilty of an anti-
trust violation 129 because it had conspired with Nobel to exclude
Westman from the market for Hobart products. In addition, how-
ever, Nobel, acting through Hobart, allegedly possessed the ability
to exclude competing distributors selling Hobart equipment. None-
theless, this alleged power to exclude other Hobart distributors did
not necessarily create the potential for harming consumers because
Nobel still faced competition in the market from other distributors
selling products similar to Hobart's, 130 and this competition limited
the ability of either Hobart or its distributors to raise prices.' 3 '
127 Westman, 796 F.2d at 1219 (noting that Hobart refused to grant Westman a
distributorship).
128 Id.
129 Westman alleged an illegal agreement in restraint of trade in violation of section
one of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Westman, 796 F.2d at 1219.
130 The competition from similar products of other firms is commonly referred to as
interbrand competition.
131 The Tenth Circuit found that "on an interbrand basis, the restaurant equipment
supply market in the Denver area is highly competitive" and that "nothing... demon-
strates that Hobart had market power." Westman, 796 F.2d at 1229. Intrabrand compe-
tition occurs between distributors or dealers handling the same manufacturer's
products. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. Ci. L. REv. 6, 6-7 (1981). Many manufacturers of products such as
automobiles, consumer electronics, and so forth require that their distributors or deal-
ers offer some service when retailing the product. The optimal combination of price and
service offered by the distributor will maximize profits for the manufacturer. For exam-
ple, it may be important for a manufacturer to have distributors who provide a wide
selection of inventory, product demonstrations, and advertising, as well as after-the-sale
servicing. However, a manufacturer also will want to minimize the opportunity for some
of its distributors to offer lower prices and fewer services, thereby "free riding" on the
efforts of other distributors. The manufacturer can do so by limiting the number of
distributors or by otherwise restricting their behavior. But as long as the availability of
substitutes from other producers constrains the manufacturer's ability to raise the price
of its products, consumers will not suffer harm. For a discussion of intrabrand and inter-
brand competition, see id. at 6-7, 11-12, 16. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the
argument that "manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining as much in-
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Given that Hobart had no market power, that is, control over
price, restricting the number of its distributors has no potential for
harming consumers either. If the price of Hobart products in-
creases as a result of limited intrabrand competition among Hobart
distributors, Hobart loses sales to its competitors. This potential
lack of sales gives Hobart some incentive to maintain competition
among its distributors. Thus, even if Hobart's distributors, acting
through Hobart, can exclude others from offering Hobart products,
consumers will not suffer harm because Hobart products face signif-
icant and substantial competition from other producers of restau-
rant kitchen equipment. This competition prevents Hobart
distributors, regardless of their number, from raising prices.
Accordingly, that portion of the Tenth Circuit's test allowing a
plaintiff to establish a defendant's market power by proving only the
defendant's ability to exclude competitors is unreliable because the
ability to exclude competition does not necessarily indicate that the
defendant has the power to raise prices above the prevailing market
price. The ability to exclude competitors, in and of itself, may have
no effect on consumers.
CONCLUSION
It is important to acknowledge that the ability to control price
in the the market varies from nonexistent for firms in perfectly com-
petitive markets to substantial in the case of a firm with control ap-
proaching that of a monopolist. The legal distinctions among firms
with different degrees of control are differences that do not exist as
"bright lines" in economic theory. Nonetheless, an appreciation of
the economic theory of different market structures is useful for
courts attempting to discern the potential for harm to consumers
from allegedly anticompetitive behavior.
In that respect, although the Tenth Circuit may have misinter-
preted the du Pont opinion and inappropriately construed the du Pont
monopoly power test as the correct test for market power, it none-
theless focused attention on the most important difference between
market power and monopoly power, i.e., the ability to exclude com-
petition. By requiring plaintiffs to prove monopoly power by dem-
onstrating both an ability to raise price and exclude competition, the
court more fully embodies the characteristics of a monopolist as de-
scribed in economic theory. As such, the Tenth Circuit's monopoly
power test provides a significantly better guide for courts attempt-
ing to ascertain the existence of monopoly power.
trabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution of their products."
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 (1977).
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However, even though the Tenth Circuit properly attempted to
establish a test for market power that enables a plaintiff to show that
the defendant's control over the market is less than that of a monop-
olist, it incorrectly suggested that the ability to exclude competition
is an appropriate method by which to establish market power. In
fact, the ability to exclude competition, a concept associated with
monopoly power, is not necessarily harmful to consumers. A more
appropriate definition of market power, as adopted by other courts,
is the ability to raise prices above the competitive level for a period
of time long enough to make it profitable to do so. The absence of
the power to exclude competitors is the element distinguishing mar-
ket power from monopoly power, and upon which courts should fo-
cus in attempting to distinguish firms with market power from those
with monopoly power.
Richard G. Price
